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From Fresnel’s wave theory of light to Einstein’s general theory of relativity, the use of novel predictions 
has a long history in the method of science. Since predictions concern empirical matters, associated 
models of the method are usually empiricist ones. However, much of the recent philosophy of science 
shows a lack of emphasis on novel predictions. The central reasons include the general thesis of 
underdetermination of theory by evidence and the marginalization of novelty to a narrower issue in 
theory assessment, the prediction-accommodation distinction. In particular, novelty has become nothing 
more than code for methods classified as unificationist criteria of theory assessment. In this paper, I will 
extend Harker’s criticisms to a broader history of novel predictions in philosophy of science. I will then 
suggest a philosophy of science rooted in empiricist ideas, new experimentalism, to recontextualize novel 
predictions and their epistemological role. I do so in hopes rehabilitating novel predictions as the core of 
empirical methods. The literature known as new experimentalism offers a particularly promising context 
for attempting this because it concerns itself with empirical progress as analyzed through the many 
epistemic values of experiments. The guiding theme of new experimentalism is the theory-independence 
of experimental phenomena. Thus, it bypasses all unificatory methods and extra-empirical tools of 
theoretical science. Through this, I aim to provide a basic characterization of novel prediction as 






The use of novel predictions has a long history in models of the method of science. 
Throughout this essay, I will refer to such models of the method as predictivist ones1. 
Since predictions concern empirical matters or credentials of theories, predictivist 
models of the method of science are usually empiricist ones, or at least significantly so. 
Much of the recent philosophy of science shows a lack of emphasis on novel 
predictions. The central reasons include the general thesis of underdetermination of 
theory by evidence. Moreover, current inclusive discussions about novel predictions 
revolve around a narrower issue in theory assessment, the prediction-accommodation 
distinction. Here novelty is a criterion guarding against ad hoc adjustments. But even 
the role of novel predictions in guarding against ad hoc methods has not gone 
unchallenged. David Harker’s (2009) recent work shows this and much of the above. 
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For Harker, novelty has become nothing more than code for methods classified as 
unificationist criteria of theory assessment.  
 
In this paper, I will suggest a philosophy of science rooted in empiricist ideas, new 
experimentalism, to contextualize novel predictions and their epistemological role. I do 
so in hopes of rehabilitating novel predictions as the core of empirical methods. New 
experimentalism is a particularly promising context for attempting this because it 
concerns itself with empirical progress as analyzed through the many epistemic values 
of experiments. The guiding theme of new experimentalism is the theory-independence 
of experimental phenomena. Thus, it bypasses all unificatory methods and tools of 
theoretical science.  
 
I will start with conceptual matters and in the first section clarify my use of key terms. 
In the second section, I will present a thematic history of predictivism to highlight the 
anti-empiricist sentiments of today. The upshot is that all methods related to novel 
predictions reduce to a-empirical, unificatory methods of science such as explanatory 
strength. In the third section, I will offer some conceptual common ground between 
theory-focused unificationist conceptualizations of science and raw empiricist 
experimentalist ones through Hacking’s (1983) famous ideas about representation and 
intervention. This will facilitate a rough empirical conceptualization of novelty as 
experimental interventions. In the final section, I briefly provide an example of how a 
more precise empirical criterion for novel predictions could be formulated. 
 
1. Empiricism and Unificationism 
 
Throughout this paper, I contrast empirical criteria with unificationist criteria in 
philosophy of science. According to empiricism, the central criterion of the method of 
science, including theory appraisal, is empirical success. Empirical success consists of 
true and/or confirmed, corroborated predictions. Unificationism, in turn, consists of 
criteria such as simplicity, coherence, and inter-theoretic connections including 
reduction. Unificationists, in other words, use extra-empirical criteria in theory 
assessment instead of or in addition to empirical adequacy or truth. These are what 
Churchland called “superempirical criteria” (1982, 228) and what Hesse called 
“coherence conditions” (1974, 51).  
 
2. History of novelty: from empiricism to unificationism 
 
The following pop history aims to clarify some of the above concepts and illustrate how 
novel prediction transformed from an empirical criterion of the method of science to an 
unificationist one. During recent history, there have been at least three paths that lead to 
this state of affairs. First, the macro-epistemologies of the 1960s and 1970s, such as 
Kuhn’s, introduced holism through unificationist criteria that invalidated purely 
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empiricist methods of science. Second, general holism and the ensuing problem of 
underdetermination left empirical criteria largely without bite. These overcame 
“empiricist” macro-epistemologies such as Lakatos’. Third, after the holistic refutations 
of empiricism, the use of novelty was relegated to the confirmational asymmetry 
between prediction and accommodation. Yet even this minimally empiricist role has 
been argued to reduce to unificationist criteria.  
 
Let us start demonstrating these historical trajectories with William Whewell, often 
seen as the father of predictivism (Barnes, 2008, 8). Whewell constructed a predictivist 
thesis as an antidote to “methods of hypothesis construction” that failed to invoke 
evidence and instead focused on heuristic and explanatory criteria (ibid, 7). Without 
demanding novel predictions, thought Whewell, hypotheses could be made to cohere 
with known phenomena through various ad hoc measures. Hence, Whewell’s focus: 
any “method of hypothesis,” whatever it may be, is legitimate only if it entails 
confirmed novel predictions of previously unknown phenomena. For Whewell, theories 
that only accommodate data are more likely to be false while theories that entail novel 
predictions are more likely to be true. As is perhaps to be expected, Whewell never 
offered any justification for the sweeping epistemological claim pertaining to truth 
(ibid, 9).  
 
Karl Popper attempted to provide a justification by conceptualizing novelty within his 
systematic theory of falsifiability. Popper made predictions the only empirical criterion 
of science. As is well known, Popper’s philosophy of science revolved around risky 
predictions and their value, or to put it from the standpoint of the concept of 
falsifiability, his model of the method revolved around degrees of falsifiability. For 
Popper, it is irrelevant to the value of the prediction whether it is confirmed or not, as 
scientific status only requires testable predictions (ibid, 10). Novel predictions are risky 
predictions and as such substantiate a theory while ad hoc ones do not, but rather lower 
their scientific status (ibid, 11). For Popper, if a theory is sufficiently accommodating 
instead of predictive, it has a low degree of falsifiability (ibid, 10). Thus, even if we 
cannot label Popper a predictivist per se, given his infamous resistance to confirmation, 
scientific status as well as lesser epistemological conclusions is based on new evidence. 
“Bold conjectures” or risky hypotheses do precisely that. However, perhaps even more 
significantly than in Whewell’s case, Popper’s dismissals of ad hoc “stratagems” or 
other decreases in falsifiability and scientific status was never properly justified (ibid, 
11). 
 
The next important step in our pop history is Imre Lakatos, who adopted Popper’s 
emphasis of predictions. Lakatos, however, argued for a more complex epistemological 
value for novelty. For him, a theory is theoretically progressive if it makes novel 
predictions and empirically progressive if these are corroborated (ibid, 13). In other 
words, novel predictions mark scientific character and their corroboration are the sole 
Res Cogitans (2013) 4                                                                                                          Havrilla | 75 
 
 
 2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans 
mark of scientific progress. As is well known, much of Lakatos’s reasons for this 
concept of novelty came from Thomas Kuhn’s criticism of Popper, specifically the idea 
of incommensurability. Kuhn famously argued for the existence of multiple 
epistemological standards across paradigms that resulted in ambiguous theory 
appraisal. According to Kuhn, a paradigm can have non-uniform definitions of fertility, 
simplicity and coherence. With his concept of novel prediction, Lakatos attempted to 
restore an empirical criterion at the heart of the methodology of scientific paradigms. 
He conceptualized novelty in terms of empirical progress and used it to overcome the 
incommensurability claims of Kuhn. Furthermore, novel predictions provide a single 
empirical interpretation of, for example, Kuhnian fertility and, thereby, make possible 
an objective, inter-paradigm, comparison of rival theories (Carrier, 1988, 212). For 
these reasons Lakatos’s concept of novelty can be associated with an empiricist instead 
of an unificationist methodology.  
 
However, Lakatos’s single empirical criterion for theory assessment remains subject to 
the problem of underdetermination (ibid, 14). For Whewell, Popper, and Lakatos, 
empirical support reduces to successful predictions. The verification of such predictions 
constitutes theory assessment. But by adding enough assumptions, any theory can be 
made consistent with the evidence - if such “accommodations” are not judged as 
unscientific.  If the only reason we prefer a theory is because of its empirical support, 
confirmed or corroborated novel predictions, then empirical support is thereby 
undermined. As Laudan aptly pointed out, extra-empirical considerations suggest 
themselves as further criteria for theory adequacy (Laudan, 1990, 276). With Leplin, 
Laudan argued persuasively that there are further avenues of “evidential support” 
outside of empirical consequences of a theory (Laudan & Leplin, 1991, 465). 
 
Although specific macro-epistemologies may have fallen out of favor, the above story 
still serves to illuminate the problems with an empirical concept of novelty. The 
implausibility of Popper’s model as shown by Kuhn’s incommensurability criticism 
lead to Lakatos’s commensurable criterion. But in one sense all macro-epistemologies 
are by definition holists about prediction. So, the worry of underdetermination never 
disappeared. Holism and underdetermination appear to undermine any concept of 
novelty or fertility that could salvage empiricism. As a result, the role of novel 
predictions has become almost systematically circumscribed and reduced to the issue of 
the confirmational asymmetry between accommodations and predictions. The steps to 
this state of affairs can be clarified best from Lakatos’s contributions.  
 
Lakatos conceptualized novel predictions as the single empirical criterion of theory 
appraisal. As such, his concept of novelty was an empirical one. However, 
accompanying the holistic criticisms of empiricist models of the method, the very 
concept of novel prediction shifted in meaning. For Lakatos’s successors in particular, 
novel prediction became less an empirical criterion and more a guard against ad hoc 
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methodology. Novel predictions provide superior confirmation to a theory than the 
theory’s accommodations insofar as they are unexpected in some way. As such, the 
crux of novel prediction is not its empirical features, the entailment of new phenomena, 
but rather (epistemologically) non-empirical features of the relevant situation such as 
the conditions of its discovery or whether other theories entail the prediction.  
 
Elie Zahar and John Worrall supplanted Lakatos’s philosophy by centering novelty’s 
use in disvalue of ad hoc modifications. Collectively, they developed versions of 
“strong predictivism” (Harker, 445). For Zahar, a result is novel if it was not included 
in the intended problems the theory was constructed to solve or accommodate (Leplin, 
1997, 49). This account construes novelty relative to the theorist. An analysis of 
confirmation depends on biographical details (ibid, 50). Worrall, in turn, attempted to 
formulate strong predictivism free of such biographical elements. According to him, 
what is relevant to confirmation is what is needed for theory construction, which is in 
turn identified through a rational reconstruction of its content (Harker, 447). By 
discovering the evidence needed we can also identify the evidence that has 
confirmatory significance. According to Worrall, data-use is suspect if the theory needs 
to introduce additional assumptions to explain the data and confirmatory if entailed but 
not needed.  
 
“Weak predictivism” differs from so called strong predictivism in that novel 
predictions, while not inherently superior, are exceptional indicators of a preferable 
theory to its alternatives (ibid, 439). Novelty can indicate satisfaction of classic 
unificationist criteria such as strength and simplicity (ibid, 436) or a reliable method of 
hypothesis discovery (ibid, 439). Curve fitting by adding parameters to accommodate 
data offers an example. In this context, Sober and Hitchcock argue that novelty is an 
indicator of theoretical simplicity. If scientists “overfit data” by adding too many 
parameters then the theory will not be able to make successful novel predictions in the 
long run (Sober and Hitchcock, 2004, 31). However, if it does successfully predict facts 
not used in the construction of the theory, we can infer the theory’s simplicity and, thus, 
that the curve was not overfitted.  
 
David Harker has recently analyzed the final stage of this pop history, including various 
positions ranging from strong to weak predictivism. Harker argues that contemporary 
predictivism either lacks epistemic justification or dissolves into more basic 
unificationist criteria. I will focus only on his purported dissolution. According to it, 
specific positions on true novel predictions rest on two intuitions about confirmation: 
an increase in explanatory strength without loss of simplicity and a reason to prefer the 
successful theory to its rivals (Harker, 448). Consider, for example, Worrall’s strong 
predictivism, which is endorsed on the basis of the disvalue of ad hoc hypotheses, 
theories built to fit particular phenomena. Heuristic predictivism is based on our 
suspicion of ad hoc or contrived hypotheses (ibid, 446). The motivation for a 
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reconstruction of needed evidence is to identify and avoid a theory that adds ad hoc 
assumptions. But this disvalue boils down to a preference for simpler theories. The 
issue is then not that the evidence wasn’t used but that no additional assumptions were 
required to entail or explain the evidence (ibid, 447). Thus, the epistemology of strong 
predictivism is an increase in explanatory strength of a theory without loss of 
theoretical simplicity. Harker argues that all predictivist intuitions ought to be 
interpreted confirmationally or epistemologically in this sense - instead of through 
some purported epistemic asymmetry between accommodation and prediction. 
 
The above overview illustrates the unificationist orientation within recent methodology 
of novel predictions, predictivism, including its recent offspring, strong and weak 
predictivism. The shift may be seen as justified by the problem of underdetermination 
associated with empiricism and a narrower preoccupation with the problem of ad hoc 
methods. With empirical criteria dispensed, predictivism was left only with a disvalue 
for ad hoc methods which cannot be divorced from the other “theoretical” virtues or 
unificatory ones.  
 
The perhaps “status quo” conclusion reached through the above history is in my view 
premature. Novel predictions as an empirical mark of success need not fully dissolve 
into unificationist criteria. The first step in demonstrating this is to acknowledge that 
novelty has uses (and meaning) outside of theory evaluation, in the experimental arm(s) 
of science. “New experimentalism” outlines a number of ways experiments carry 
epistemic weight for theories and their significance in the absence of higher-level 
theories. 
 
3. New Experimentalism 
 
Ian Hacking’s (1983) famous distinction between representations and interventions 
provides a common ground for theory-based concepts of prediction and experimental 
practices. Representations are theories, and, as such, hypothetical in nature (ibid, 273). 
Predictivism inhabits the sphere of representations. Predictions are a deciding factor 
between competing scientific representations. As entailments of theories, predictions 
are inherently a theoretical concept. Hacking’s interventions, in turn, concern 
manipulating and “doing”. They involve experimental setups and causes (ibid, 272)2. 
Their causal nature allows interventions to persist through higher-level theory change 
(Chalmers, 2002, 161). From Hacking’s perspective on epistemology, representations 
compete to explain the same phenomena but are subject to change; interventions 
manipulate phenomena, create other phenomena, and, once demonstrated, become 
permanent causal facts (Hacking, 274). Hacking’s distinction underwrites a sense of 
empirical progress that downplays if not disregards representations: the persisting and 
increasing store of experimental knowledge persists and increases regardless of theory, 
representations. In this context, I contend novelty and its connection to explanatory 
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strength can depend on an “interventionist” prediction concept that is distinguished 
from the traditional theoretical concept through its independence from theory.  
 
In new experimentalism, the value of experimental practices is based on their epistemic 
significance and independence from theory. In its most extreme formulation, an 
experiment is said to have “a life of its own” (Franklin, 1999, 35). This empiricist 
bottom line can and does relate to theories. Some theoretical programs do not articulate 
experimental setups yet theory-independent setups generate results that need to be 
explained. If there are rival explanations of new experimental phenomena, these 
experimental results can even function as a crucial test, as classically understood (ibid, 
36). Through the test, rival theories are either ruled out, indicated as less probable than 
others, or shown to all be eliminated due to the necessity of a new theory to 
accommodate the results. In short, through many interventions, experimenters are able 
to validate the existence of phenomena without the need of referring to some higher-
level theory or representation (Chalmers, 160).  
 
Within the “epistemology of experiment,” a significant emphasis is placed on 
predicting the outcomes of certain interventions concerning new phenomena and not on 
grounds of deduction from theories but on “mere” experimental grounds (Franklin, 51 
& Chalmers, 161). These kinds of generalizations or “predictions”, of sorts, support the 
existence of phenomena - despite the fact that no theory immediately explains/entails 
them. These phenomena are captured in experimental generalizations. They may of 
course be entailed by representational theories, but the results themselves are as real as 
the relevant interventions and satisfy most criteria of novelty as confirmed predictions 
of genuinely new and/or anomalous phenomena. As interventions, all plausible theories 
will have to accommodate them in some way (Chalmers, 160).  
 
According to classic predictivists, theoretical frameworks will be significantly 
confirmed if they entail novel predictions. But in an interventionist sense of novelty, 
such predictions of new phenomena validate a theory or generalization only insofar as 
these are significantly connected to the result in question. This provides an alternative 
prediction criterion steeped in causal relationships. It can be characterized by a 
paradigmatic example of novel prediction, Fresnel’s bright spot. The novel prediction 
of the bright spot significantly confirmed Fresnel’s version of the wave theory of light 
and elevated it above the rival particle theories of the time. However, many 
accompanying notions of Fresnel’s theory that were thereby also confirmed have since 
been disregarded, such as the existence of the “elastic ether” (ibid, 164). But the 
experimental results articulated by Fresnel still hold true. Interventions in this case 
confirm higher-level theories only insofar as they represent novel interventions. The 
general theory remains hypothetical and subject to change and, thus, not as significantly 
confirmed as the interventionist aspects of the result. Confirmed experimental 
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phenomena can and do survive drastic theory change and persist even when the theory 
that entailed them fails.  
 
At this juncture, the concept of “interventionist-prediction” and its association with 
theory appraisal is intentionally imprecise. It is unclear how we can distinguish 
interventions from the (rest of a) representational, theoretical framework. Yet, new 
experimentalism contends the independence of interventions from theory. Because of 
this, interventions and their results are yet to be unified into some theoretical 
framework. They are more accurately described as novel phenomena caused by 
interventions instead of just novel predictions.  
 
The key to resolving these ambiguities is connecting novel predictions, as interventions, 
to the explanatory strength of the theory that entails them, which would require a 
specific epistemological framework that accounts for the epistemic values of 
experiment and its connection to explanation. There is not space here to fully flesh out 
what such a framework would look like completely, so let me briefly provide an 
example of a possible direction based on recent philosophy of science.  
 
4. Woodward’s testing interventions 
 
In Making Things Happen (2004), James Woodward has proposed a theory of causal 
explanation that gives precise meaning to intervention through causation to develop an 
empirical concept of explanation. His concept is “invariance.” Woodward’s invariance 
is a concept of scientific generality and an empiricist notion of explanation. It 
intentionally avoids all unificationist associations such as scope and strength. Novelty 
and its empirical connection to explanatory strength can be articulated within his 
system in a manner that makes novel predictions also distinct from unificationist 
methods. The key is linking his concept of “important testing interventions”, which are 
predictions meant to test experimental generalizations, to degree of explanatory 
strength (Woodward, 264). Novel predictions in this sense would be the epistemic tools 
by which new and important kinds of interventions are referenced and incorporated into 
the domain of a scientific generalization. These confirm a generalization by facilitating 
its explanatory depth.  
 
This rough (and incomplete) concept of novelty avoids the problems that plagued 
predictivism, which stem from unificationist ideas. Moreover, problems with 
underdetermination are less applicable to this approach on Hackingesque grounds. For 
underdetermination to occur, the interventions would have to constitute evidence under-
determining the representations. Lakatosian predictivism and its successors all are also 
concerned with the level of representations, theories, and their relation to confirmed 
empirical facts. At that level, the evidence testing the competing representations is 
under-determining. And at that level, unificationist criteria usually enter the model of 
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the method to “save” rational theory appraisal. Woodward’s account and similar 
empirical accounts, on the other hand, leads to epistemological criteria based in 
interventions and related experimental practices that can operate independently of 
theoretical frameworks. Such evidentiary methods avoid underdetermination because 
interventions are the (under-determining) evidence from a Lakatosian perspective 
(Carrier, 1988, 217)! Underdetermination and the associated problems for predictivism 
enter only when the generalizations that constitute novel evidence would confirm a 





I started the paper with Harker’s dissolution of novel predictions to unificationist 
criteria. I contend that insights from new experimentalism allow for connections 
between theories and experimental interventions. In short, novel predictions become 
novel interventions that potentially measure and facilitate an empirical concept of 
explanatory strength. This is independent of unificationist criteria such as Harker’s. I 
believe this concept can also express and establish some of the original ideas and goals 
of predictivism. Harker’s dissolution, while still applicable to contemporary 
predictivism (the prediction-accommodation question), does not encompass all 
methodologies of novel prediction. Given the association between unificationism and 
Hacking’s representations, I also believe that this concept could form a foundation for a 
new and superior predictivism since this sense of novelty can fit the epistemology of 
representations even if its home is in the experimental side of science. Woodward’s 
framework in particular could provide a more precise articulation of novel predictions 
as empirical criteria. Novelty’s origin is in interventions, in the unique kind of learning 
science offers, and it is in this context that we should identify the core sense of novelty 





Barnes, Eric C. The Paradox of Predictivism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511487330 
 
Carrier, Martin. “On Novel Facts: A Discussion of Criteria for Non-ad-hoc-ness in the 
Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes.” Journal for General Philosophy of 
Science 19.2 (1988): 205-231. 
 
Chalmers, Alan. “Experiment and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge.” In the 
Scope of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science. Ed. Gardenfors, Peter, 
Res Cogitans (2013) 4                                                                                                          Havrilla | 81 
 
 
 2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans 
Wolenski, Jan, Kijiana-Placek, Katarzynan. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002. 157-
170. 
 
Churchland, Paul.  (1982),  "The Anti-Realist Epistemology  of  van Fraassen's The 
Scientific Image." Pacific Philosophical  Quarterly LXIII 3 (1982):  226-235. 
 
Franklin, Allan. “The Roles of Experiment” Physics in Perspective 1 (1999): p35-53. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s000160050004 
 
Hacking, Ian. Representing and Intervening. Cambridge University Press. New York, 
NY, 1983. 
 
Harker, David. “On the Predilections for Predictions.” British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science 59 (2009): 429-453. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axn017 
 
Hesse, Mary B. The Structure of Scientific Inference. Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1974. 
 
Kuhn, Thomas. “Objectivity, Value Judgement, and Theory Choice.” Scientific 
Knowledge: Basic Issues in the Philosophy of Science. Ed. Kourany, Janet A. Belmont, 
CA: Wadsworth Pub. Co, 1987. 212-224.  
 
Laudan, Larry. “Demystifying Underdetermination.” Scientific Theories. Ed. Savage, C 
W. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990. 267-297 
 
Laudan, Larry, and Jarrett Leplin. "Empirical Equivalence and 
Underdetermination." The Journal of Philosophy 88.9 (1991): 449-472. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2026601 
 
Leplin, J. A Novel Defense of Scientific Realism, New York and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997. 
 
Sober, Elliot & Hitchcock, Christopher. “Prediction Versus Accommodation and the 
Risk of Overfitting.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55.1 (2004): 1-34. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/55.1.1 
 
Woodward, James. Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2003.  
 
                                                          
1 I acknowledge that the current meaning of predictivism is much narrower, see page 6. 
2 According to Hacking’s experimental realism interventions transform entities from 
hypothetical to reality. 
